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Abstract. Understanding humor in human social interaction is a pre-
requisite to the creation of engaging interactions between humans and
digital assistants, embodied conversational agents and social robots. As
these HCI methods become more prevalent and pervasive, more advanced
conversational discourse abilities will be required. However, many models
of dialogue and human communication used in computer science remain
based upon out-dated understanding of the manner in which humans
communicate with one another. This paper addresses these issues in-
troducing a view of communication based on Relevance theory and the
Analogical Peacock Hypothesis in which humor and humorous interac-
tions are viewed as ostensive challenges inviting the receiver of a com-
munication to engage in greater levels of cognitive processing and effort
to resolve the challenge set by a humorous display. The increased effort
is rewarded with positive socio-cognitive effects—a humorous payoff and
knowledge of the mind-reading abilities of the humor producer.
Keywords: Humor, Mind-Reading, Relevance Theory, Analogical Pea-
cock Hypothesis, Ostensive Challenge
1 Introduction
The use of humor in human communication is perhaps one of the simplest ways
to demonstrate a mastery of a given language and a deep understanding of the
social and cultural norms within which the humorous communication is taking
place. We value displays of humor highly and also often place those who can
consistently display wit and conversational humor amongst the most deserv-
ing of our social praise and accolades. These factors alone should make humor,
and the laughter that often accompanies it, a prime focus for scientific study—
unfortunately, they are all too often peripheral within social, cognitive and com-
munication science. In the late 20th century and early 21st century great strides
were made in the advancement of natural language processing as a computational
endeavour and in the understanding of human language from a computational
perspective. However, certain aspects of the intricate use of human language have
proven particularly obstinate and resistant to computational modelling. Partic-
ularly difficult aspects to model include the understanding of sarcasm, irony,
metaphor, and humor. Deft use of these aspects of human language show that
2 Humor as an Ostensive Challenge
a communicator understands the nature of the environment in which they find
themselves at a deep level—this importantly often involves the incorporation
of current contextual information, an awareness of currently salient topics and
an awareness of what is likely to be of interest in the minds of the audience to
which the humor is oriented. Knowing what is currently relevant and interesting
is one of the key challenges in both computational natural language processing
and computational modelling of humor; typical current solutions use abstract or
out of date toy problem data sets that are unlikely to be current and relevant
[1].
McKeown [2] [1] has argued that the use of humor and the laughter that
relates to humor use are best thought of as mutual displays of the fact that one
knows what is happening in the mind of interlocutors. Humor displays mind-
reading ability to conversational partners and this creates a desire to socially
bond with the humorous person and laughter is, at its core, a social bonding
signal.
2 The Shannon and Weaver model and the Conduit
Metaphor
A crucial factor in the computational modelling of humor are the assumptions
made concerning the nature of human communication. Usually, a fundamental
assumption is to base a conceptualisation of human communication on the com-
monly used Shannon and Weaver model [3] and some version of what has been
termed “the conduit metaphor” [4] or the code model as it is sometimes known
[5]. These approaches tend to view communication in general, with human com-
munication as a special case, as a system designed to pass information from one
entity or person to another—the main goal of the communication process being
the efficient transmission or exchange of information. A schematic diagram of
the classic Shannon and Weaver model is displayed in Figure 1.
Source Encoder Channel Decoder Destination
Noise
Message Signal Received
Message
Received
Signal
Fig. 1. Shannon and Weaver model of communication [3].
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In this account—which stems from the mathematical and electronics disci-
plines from which Shannon and Weaver came—an information source creates a
message which is then encoded in some way to create a signal. That signal is sent
through some communication channel with the possibility of become contami-
nated by noise. Once in the channel it can be picked up by receivers who may be
equipped with the knowledge, motivation and wherewithal to decode the signal
and therefore receive the message and the information it contains. This model
works very well in the world of electronic signalling and telecommunications—it
therefore has had much appeal in the related disciplines of information technol-
ogy and computer science. However, it has also been widely been adopted in
other areas of science where its basic assumptions may not be quite so tenable;
it is often taken as a basis for reasoning and thought concerning animal commu-
nication and human language and communication. Figure 2 displays a version
of the Shannon and Weaver model as it is often adapted and applied to human
communication circumstances.
Speaker Hearer
Central
Thought 
Processes
Linguistic 
Encoder Air
Linguistic
Decoder
Central
Thought 
Processes
Noise
Thought
Acoustic
Signal
Received
Thought
Received
Acoustic
Signal
Fig. 2. The Shannon and Weaver model applied to human communication (adapted
from Sperber & Wilson, 1995 [5]).
Reddy [4] noted and challenged a similar aspect of the way we think about
human communication that is related to the Shannon and Weaver [3] under-
standing of communication. Reddy suggested that the way that we conceptu-
alise and think about human communication is built upon a strongly held and
deeply pervasive metaphor that he termed the conduit metaphor. The central
idea is that we talk about and use a narrative about human communication
based on a metaphor that suggests we pass information to one another packaged
in containers of some form through some general conduit. When we think about
how we communicate we use some intuitive form of the Shannon-Weaver for-
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mulation moving information from one mind to another; when a container filled
with information reaches a receiver they then take it out of the container using
some sort of decoding mechanism or linguistic code whereupon they become the
possessors of the transmitted information. The english language is replete with
uses of the metaphor, some of the examples used by Reddy are: “try to get your
thoughts across better,” “None of Mary’s feelings came through to me with any
clarity,” “you still haven’t given me any idea of what you mean,” “you’ve put
each concept into words very carefully,” and “trying to pack more thoughts into
fewer words”. The pervasive nature of this metaphor means it is difficult to es-
cape and retain clarity in communication—and no attempt will be made to do so
within this paper. However, it forces us to think about communication in a cer-
tain way and constrains us to a certain frame that may not be helpful when we
think about the nature of both animal and human communication. It is there-
fore worth highlighting and making explicit these commonly held underlying
assumptions before exploring the nature of human communication, especially in
situations in which we seek to create computational models of the necessary pro-
cesses. As modellers we are too often guilty of accepting assumptions without
question when creating models, yet our computational models are completely
unaware of these assumptions. Indeed, it is often one of the most useful parts of
the computational modelling endeavour that it exposes and makes us aware of
assumptions that were difficult to see.
There are many reasons to be doubtful that the Shannon-Weaver formula-
tion or the conduit metaphor that we intuitively use are useful ways to con-
ceptualise both animal and human communication. One of the principle reasons
is that many linguistic utterances are highly underdetermined and rely heavily
on shared contextual knowledge to ensure correct interpretation. There is much
mind-reading that goes on around the process of human communication and
one of the most influential theories that explains and clarifies these processes is
Relevance theory [5].
3 Relevance Theory and Underdetermined Language
Relevance Theory [5] provides an account for how underdetermined signals func-
tion in humans communication. The core realisation is one common to much of
linguistic pragmatics—although it is not often stated in these terms—the real-
isation that there is a lot of mind-reading involved in which a communicator
makes an assessment of the knowledge that is already available to the receiver
through context and other streams of evidence. This mind-reading is, of course,
the scientific view of mind-reading [6], related to perspective-taking, mentaliz-
ing, and theory of mind and not the theatrical or telepathic version. Informally,
an underdetermined amount of encoded linguistic information is provided in an
utterance, after a mind-reading based assessment of the knowledge available to
a receiver in a given context. The pre-assessment of the knowledge that is avail-
able from the current context in which the communication is taking place—this
occurs almost entirely at an unconscious level—allows the communicator to craft
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an utterance that only contains a minimal amount of information, as much as
is required to infer the communicators intended meaning. In other words, the
utterance contains only sufficient information that when it is combined with the
contextual knowledge available to the receiver, and with any extra non-verbal
communication, that all the pieces of evidence taken together produce an infer-
ential interpretation of the meaning communicator is seeking to impart. Rather
than it being a matter of encoding the entirety of a message and placing it in a
container to be decoded, a careful mind-reading assessment allows the minimal
amount of information—the underdetermined linguistic piece of evidence—to be
combined with contextual knowledge and non-verbal communication and then
assembled within the mind of the receiver to infer intended meaning. As an ex-
ample, if I were to provide the utterance “John is a soldier,” a receiver would
take a very different understanding of the utterance if it was provided in the
context of a military base or within a school. A further contextual qualifica-
tion might occur in the school situation if we were in the school play ground
where the child may be playing a war-like game or in the presence of the school
nurse where the it may mean that John was a child that was sick or had hurt
himself and was displaying some stoical qualities while receiving treatment. The
linguistic utterance does not change but is interpreted in very different ways
dependent on the context in which it is provided. This has important implica-
tions for human communication and the cultural knowledge and context that
is available and utilised in human communication. This tacit use of background
knowledge is not accounted for in the Shannon-Weaver models or at best it is
only implied in the encoding and decoding aspects of the model in ways that
hide its importance.
4 Cognitive Effect and the Ostensive-Inferential Model
A basic principle of Relevance theory is that an input—an utterance or some
information from some external source—is relevant if it has a positive cognitive
effect. Wilson and Sperber [7] give the example of a “true conclusion” having
a positive cognitive effect as it improves the user’s representation of the world.
However, according the Analogical Peacock Hypothesis [2], the truth, or veri-
fiable mind-world mappings, are not a core or necessary part of human com-
munication. These mappings between representations and an objective reality
have value in problem solving situations and certainly improve representations
of the world, yet much of human communication can function without problem
without any need for verifiability against evidence from a sensed reality; this
becomes obvious when we consider story-telling, myths, legends and religion.
What is really important in human communication is information that has some
social currency—information that is interesting to others within a chosen social
group rather than whether it is true or not. Fantastical or sensational informa-
tion may have value or positive cognitive effects for an individual irrespective
of its veracity. Within Relevance theory, general positive cognitive effects are
more likely with relevant material, and, importantly for the current argument,
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relevant material is also thought to be inversely related to the processing effort
required by an input. That is, if an utterance requires greater use of perception,
memory or inference it is less likely to be relevant. This core argument of this
paper is that in situations of humor this may not be the case. The Relevance the-
ory ideas are based on an assumption that evolutionary selection pressures have
led to an inexorable drive towards efficiency creating the “Cognitive Principle
of Relevance” that “human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of
relevance”. However, according to the Analogical Peacock Hypothesis much of
human communication has developed through sexual selection and entails costly
signalling where the need for straightforward efficiency is less obvious and in-
deed sometimes it could be counterproductive [8]. This means that in situations
of creative display as in humor production the goal of being efficient in terms
of communication is not necessarily desirable and the cognitive effect of a com-
munication is oriented towards displaying mind-reading abilities rather than the
efficient transfer or exchange of information.
Another important aspect of human communication comes from the commu-
nicators intentions. A communicator has two kinds of intention when they seek
to tell someone something. First, they must first grab someones attention and
make them aware that they are about to communicate something and second,
they must communicate it. This is part of what is known as the ostensive in-
ferential model in Relevance theory. There is both an intention to inform—the
informative intention—and an intention to inform that they wish to commu-
nicate something—the communicative intention. The communicative intention
is signalled to a receiver by grabbing attention through some sort of ostensive
signal [5], this is a signalling of signalhood [9]—it is achieved in many ways,
perhaps with a wave or a movement that is slightly incongruous for a situa-
tion. Once a receiver becomes aware of an ostensive stimulus or signal then
they have knowledge of a communicator’s informative intention and this in turn
raises expectations of relevance in the utterance that is likely to follow from the
communicator.
5 Cognitive Effort and Optimal Relevance
The ostensive-inferential model in combination with the Cognitive Principle of
Relevance leads to another general principle, the Communicative Principle of
Relevance. This principle suggests that when a message sender makes an osten-
sive signal indicating that they have an intention to communicate something,
they also make the assumption that the receiver will wish to be communicated
to. Consequently, they are presuming that the receiver will be interested in the
information that they have to say or convey. Therefore, the sender has an expec-
tation that the receiver will engage in the cognitive effort required to infer the
meaning the sender wishes to convey; as a result, the receiver will have an expec-
tation that the sender will be maximising the relevance of the utterance—with
all the concomitant mind-reading this entails. The Communicative Principle of
Relevance states that “every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own
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optimal relevance”. The idea of optimal relevance suggests that an intention to
communicate provides strong evidence to a receiver that a sender thinks that
the information they wish to convey is worth a receiver’s effort in processing it.
Similarly, given this expectation is being placed in the mind of the receiver, a
sender should ensure that they provide a relevant communication if they wish
the receiver to understand their communication and if they wish to ensure that
they have a reputation as someone worth communicating with in the future.
6 Display and Alignment in the Analogical Peacock
Hypothesis
The Analogical Peacock Hypothesis [2] suggests that there are two fundamental
kinds of human communication, display and alignment. Display communications
are the most fundamental—they concern the display of the mind-reading abili-
ties of the sender. The motivation to display one’s mind-reading abilities stems
from the evolutionary advantages that are gained through rising up through the
ranks of a social hierarchy [10]. The Analogical Peacock Hypothesis combines
two evolutionary schools of thought, the social brain hypothesis [11], [12], [13],
[14], and the use of mental fitness indicators [15], [16], to explain this connection
between social status and mind-reading display. As our social groups became
larger and more sophisticated, those who were better at climbing their social
hierarchy would have access to better resources and mating possibilities due to
their elevated status; amongst the most important skills required for climbing so-
cial hierarchies are the socio-political skills of perspective-taking, mind-reading
and theory of mind. The Analogical Peacock Hypothesis argues that at some
stage in human evolution these skills became sexually selected, starting an arms
race that required ever more intricate ways of displaying these abilities. A first
stage involved non-verbal and emotional display, showing knowledge of what
was in another individual’s mind and their desires through processes of empa-
thy, cooperation, kindness, and gift giving. An evolutionary arms race—typical
of sexual selection—amongst those competing to display these skills would re-
quire ever more intricate ways to display and ever more discerning abilities to
differentiate between those who are skilled displayers. Given enough time the
limits of any given signal as a means to differentiate mind-reading and attrac-
tiveness in general are likely to be reached. At this point, specific signals are
likely to become thresholds that must be reached to retain attractiveness as a
potential partner or ally; beyond these thresholds further more intricate means
of display would be required in order to discern between high level mind-reading
abilities. This would lead to a multi-modal signalling system in which various
streams of non-verbal information contributed to the overall signal.
With the arrival of symbolic communication, verbal and analogical styles
of display became an option for displaying mind-reading abilities. The original
Analogical Peacock Hypothesis paper [2] highlighted the importance of verbal
proficiency, intelligence, creativity and humor in this respect; Miller [16] gave a
long list of potential mental fitness indicators including culture, music, art and
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creativity, language in conversation and storytelling, humor (both verbal and
nonverbal), and morality such as kindness, honesty, humility, and gift-giving.
Many of these indicators are amongst the most sought after qualities in potential
mates, commonly found in cross-cultural mate preference studies [17], [18]. From
the Analogical Peacock Hypothesis point of view one of the most useful tools in
signalling mind-reading ability is the creative combination of concepts. Being
able to combine concepts in a way that others have not yet thought about
displays a strong knowledge of the contents of their mind and shows that one
has very strong mind-reading abilities. This creative combination of concepts
is a highly typical component of linguistic humor [19], [20]. A potential origin
for the creative combination of concepts is in human linguistic gossip—a key
element of Dunbar’s take on the Social Brain Hypothesis [12] and important in
the evolution of language [21]. The presentation of information of interest about
two members of a social hierarchy involved in some romantic but compromising
tryst, for example, provides a salacious or perhaps taboo piece of knowledge that
is likely to be of interest, a novel creative combination of sorts. Such news is
likely to have been met with surprise, and concomitant jaw-dropping style facial
responses, as they are today. More abstract combinations of information and
juxtaposition may have arisen through storytelling processes based on fictional
gossip style tales leading to humorous combinations. The use of novel salacious
gossip is likely to be a form of display of mind-reading. It shows that a sender is
aware of what is likely to be interesting to another individual within their shared
social hierarchy, and that they have a strong knowledge of what is taboo and
permissible behaviour within their culture. This kind of disclosure of information
and sharing of social currency is likely to result in a desire for social bonding,
although it would not be without risk of social sanction—making it a useful
discernment tool in mind-reading ability. Gossip is also a crucial factor in the
second main kind of human communication—alignment communications.
The second kind of communication comes about as a result of the first. To be
able to display mind-reading abilities one must know what is in the mind of other
people. In the modern world this means a lifetime dedicating oneself to learning
one’s culture and aligning one’s mind with those that you are likely to want to
impress. The majority of human communication is probably oriented towards
alignment. Most of the receiver aspects of human communication are alignment
oriented—with a smaller amount based around judging display communications.
The distinctions between these types of communications are not strong or clear
and people may revert into one or another quickly as opportunities arise and
change throughout the dynamics of conversation and social interaction.
The picture presented so far in Relevance theory with the intertwined nature
of cognitive effects and effort and the presumption of optimal relevance fits an
alignment view of communication more closely than a display view of commu-
nication. However it clearly has very strong aspects in which mind-reading is
highly important.
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7 Humor as an Ostensive Challenge to Increase Cognitive
Effort
The core argument being made in this paper is that in the situation in which
a humorous exchange is being made a sender is seeking to display their mind-
reading ability, and this leads to a special circumstance that is not accounted for
in standard Relevance theory. The need to display mind-reading ability means
that a sender is doing something more than making a standard underdeter-
mined utterance, in Relevance theoretic terms, or an alignment communication
in Analogical Peacock Hypothesis terms. The move to display changes the com-
municative dynamic. This paper argues that a special kind of ostensive stimulus
is required, an ostensive challenge, in which the receiver is invited to expend a
greater level of cognitive effort than would normally be the case in order to find
a not so obviously relevant connection between two or more concepts. In these
situations, in which a display communication is being flagged, the presumption
of optimal relevance may give way to a principle of obscure and non-salient
relevance—an indication that the sender is aware of a relevant connection be-
tween these two or more concepts but that it is not easy or simple to make
the connection. It then becomes a challenge to the receiver to try and find the
connection without being given a clue or punchline by the sender. Upon failure
to rise to the challenge the sender may then choose to provide the answer.
There are many kinds of joke or humorous situation that can create an osten-
sive challenge, however, there are some obvious candidates—some of the most
apparent are the earliest joke set-ups that we learn, for instance, the two words
“Knock knock...” are famously the start of a joke telling formula. Other highly
formulaic examples would be the “I say, I say, I say...” of music hall or vaudeville
comedians or a more modern “A [insert joke element] walks into a bar...”. There
are many smaller and more subtle cues that may be ostensive challenges too,
non-verbal facial expressions or changes in tone of voice may serve to high-
light the change from an alignment communication to a display communication
with an ostensive challenge. These signals of an ostensive challenge highlight
the existence of a joke telling or humorous frame but the function remains the
same—letting the listener know that they are being challenged to look for an
answer that requires an increase in cognitive effort. The challenge being set is
that for the concepts offered as a potential combination there exists a relevant
conceptual combination—the combination can be found, but finding it will re-
quire a greater than typical amount of cognitive effort. If found by the receiver
or revealed by the sender there will be a payoff that is worth the extra cognitive
effort to find it—a humorous payload.
The ostensive challenge implies that even though the effort is greater the
normal level of effort that would be expected in an alignment communication,
it will still be worth the cognitive effort to find the connection. If the sender has
sufficient mind-reading skills to make a solid inference about the receiver’s taste
in humor in relation to the quality of joke, and its suitability given the context
and mood—the joke or attempt at humor will be funny and make the receiver
laugh.
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From an Analogical Peacock Hypothesis point of view, the ostensive challenge
informs the receiver that a display communication is taking place; the sender is
indicating that two or more concepts exist that can be connected in the mind
of the receiver, these concepts are typically presented in the joke setup. It also
implies that the sender or joke-teller is aware of the connection but has judged
that the receiver is not aware of it. This creates a clear situation in which the
sender is letting the receiver know that they are aware of the contents and rela-
tional connections between conceptual representations that exist in the receiver’s
mind—and in an intricate way. The knowledge of the conceptual connection re-
mains within the control of the sender or joke-teller right up until the point of
a reveal in the form of a punchline, unless of course the receiver can rise to the
challenge and find the connections for themselves.
There is also an additional layer of mind-reading ability on display, one con-
cerning receiver knowledge of humorous taste. The joke-teller is making an as-
sumption that they can tell or are aware of the humorous taste of the receiver.
They are also making assumptions about the interaction of humorous taste with
current contextual factors such as the social environment and the receiver’s mood
when the joke is told. That is, an assessment is being made as to whether the
receiver will be suitably receptive to the attempt at humor that the joke-telling
utterance entails. This involves a number of social risks. Jokes are prepackaged
and therefore not original displays of wit, as a result there is a greater onus in
any judgement on the assessment of a receiver’s receptivity, as the teller usually
cannot or does not claim to be a joke’s author. Many jokes are met with groans
of disapproval rather than laughter if any of the various factors made in the
contextual assessment are poorly judged.
8 Positive Socio-cognitive Effects
Encounters that include an ostensive challenge must still have strong positive
cognitive effects; perhaps, they may be better termed as positive socio-cognitive
effects. These interactions improve the user’s representation of the social world.
They do not necessarily require mind-world mappings. Nothing in the interaction
need refer to an external empirical test of an objective reality—although that
may of course be included and may improve the humor by making it a harder
to fake signal—the inclusion of context and concurrent facts make quick witted
mind-reading ability more obvious [2], [1]. However, mind-world mappings are
not necessary. The positive socio-cognitive effect comes from the social evidence
that the attempt at humor provides. It allows information concerning the pair
of interlocutor’s social standing in their present social hierarchy to be adjusted
and updated. The sender has taken an opportunity to display, that is, they have
seen an opportunity to elevate their social standing with someone with whom
they seek to socially bond, and have told them a joke or created a humorous
event as part of an affiliative process. These displays are inherently risky, for
if they are not performed well and the humor falls flat, the sender will have
exposed their desire to socially bond and concurrently displayed an ineffectual
Humor as an Ostensive Challenge 11
ability to adequately mind-read and assess the social mood of the receiver. For
the receiver there is a positive socio-cognitive effect in the knowledge that they
are viewed as worth the risk of an attempt at an affiliation oriented display. If
a receiver provides an honest signal in response, a hard-to-fake genuine laugh,
it is a signal that the humor was successful and requires an evaluation or re-
evaluation of the relationship—typically this means an elevation of a sender’s
social standing with respect to the receiver. A display that is not received as
humorous but falls flat may be met with a polite low intensity laugh requiring
no re-evaluation of social standing, at least not in an upwards direction. A groan
or negative comment may indicate that there is value in the social relationship,
but that it comes from other dimensions that are not the humorous one, or
that sufficient social capital already exists that a current poor performance will
be tolerated. An absence of any response at all is likely to mean that there
is very little future in the social relationship. Therefore, although the current
argument suggests an addition to Relevance theory based thinking concerning
humor—one that accommodates the two kinds of communication suggested by
the Analogical Peacock Hypothesis—there still remains the overall requirement
for positive cognitive effects that make the communicative interchange and social
interaction beneficial for both parties.
9 Implications for Computational Models of Humor
The importance of incorporating humor into computational dialogue models of
human computer interaction has been made before [22], [23], [24], However, due
to the intricate nature of human conversational interaction and given the many
prevalent and commonly made erroneous assumptions about the nature and
function of human communication—some of which are outlined at the start of
this paper—there has been little incorporation of humor into dialogues that oc-
cur in real-time and that can flow-freely. Most dialogues models are constrained
to fixed scenarios or involve tasks such as information provision that are highly
functional in nature. Tactics used to incorporate humor in these situations in-
volve the use of canned jokes and self-deprecating humor. This is largely safe
ground as it can be pre-prepared and involves little in the way of a need to be
aware of contextual knowledge. This approach also requires minimal assessment
and knowledge of the minds of an audience or a receiver that any given crafted
utterance will be directed towards.
Digitial assistants such as Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, Google’s “Google
Now” feature and Microsoft’s Cortana are becoming more prevalent in our daily
lives through their presence in our mobile devices and increasingly in our house-
holds. To make these interactions less monotonous they will require the use of
humor and laughter in a more free flowing way [1]. To achieve this in a con-
vincing manner requires a much stronger assessment and incorporation of the
conversational context and receiver knowledge on the part of the sender than
is currently occurs. This kind of information is currently available in ways that
were not previously accessible and incorporation of mind-reading and contex-
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tual knowledge should make interactions much more personable and pleasant.
More complete and nuanced models of human communicative interaction are
required than simply thinking it is sufficient to provide information. Computa-
tional models will require knowledge of social and cultural norms, incorporation
of context and assessment of the receiver’s goals and desires. They will also need
to socially engage at the appropriate level of social distance. This means be-
ing very nuanced in the degree to which they target interactions. The use of
ostensive challenges will provide a useful tool as these models increase in the
level of pervasiveness and intrusion they create in our lives. Providing too much
knowledge or mind-reading without the appropriate judgement and etiquette
can be perceived as creepy or awkward. Something like an “uncanny valley” of
conversational interaction probably exists where too much information can be
known about an individual for them to be fully comfortable—an overly informed
human gives a “stalker” kind of feeling, a machine will probably feel even worse
as it will have implications of the corporate intrusion of privacy. However, the
appropriate use of ostensive challenges may permit humor to be tested in ways
that will let models learn an individual’s sense of humor, what works for certain
people and in what circumstances. It may even become a sought after feature
in circumstances when a user is bored or requires some elevation in mood. If we
are to make genuinely funny and humorous digital companions that are creative
in their humor generation rather than simply regurgitating jokes or humorous
memes from social media, then delivering humor through the use of ostensive
challenges is likely to minimise the degree to which failure to be funny will be
detrimental to an overall relationship with a digital assistant.
There are many ethical issues that must be considered concerning the degree
to which we wish to have our digital assistants become charming social interac-
tants and companions. Artificial intelligence is not after all artificial sentience;
creating the illusion of artificial sentience is an aspect of artificial intelligence
that needs to be considered carefully. Adding humor and increasingly appropri-
ate conversational abilities is likely to increase the levels of anthropomorphism
we indulge in these algorithms. These systems should require opt-in choices,
and much care needs to be taken in not overstepping the mark. These machines
are in many ways the equivalent of ventriloquist’s dummies and while suspend-
ing disbelief for a period of time may be entertaining it is probable that some
people will assume that there are actual sentient capabilities within these algo-
rithmically driven entities. Therefore, there is an ethical onus on the producers
of such machines to ensure that they are perceived in that way and enjoyed
as such, rather than becoming so believable that the attribution of sentience is
given where no sentience exists. Creating machines with stronger humor abilities
makes that burden of responsibility a stronger obligation.
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